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Kathryn A. Christmann ***
The best way to suppose what may come, is to remember what is past.
George Savile, Marquis of Halifax
LTHOUGH the 1993 Legislature declined to enact major tax re-
form, several legislative changes have the potential to effect substan-
tial changes in the administration of Texas taxes. As during last
year's Survey period, decisions from other jurisdictions, Texas courts, and
administrative hearings, also impact Texas tax law.'
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
A landmark decision handed down during the survey period was Itel Con-
tainers International Corp. v. Huddleston.2 In Itel, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee sales tax on the proceeds of leases of
containers used exclusively in international commerce. The Court expressly
held that the tax in question did not violate either of the international con-
ventions on containers,3 the foreign commerce clause4 or the import-export
clause.5
Itel leased cargo containers for use exclusively in international commerce.
The containers were delivered by Itel to the lessees or their agents in many
states, including Tennessee. After Tennessee assessed tax on the proceeds
Itel earned from the leased containers delivered in Tennessee, Itel's refund
suit challenged the constitutionality of the tax. The Tennessee Chancery
courts reduced the amount of the assessment on state law grounds, but re-
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
•* B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
• B.A., Rice University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania. Attorney at Law, Hughes &
Luce, L.L.P., Austin, Texas.
1. Cases, regulations and other developments that fell within this Survey period but were
included in last year's Survey article are not included in this article. See Cynthia M.
Ohlenforst & Jeff W. Dorrill, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1803
(1993).
2. 113 S. Ct. 1095 (1993).
3. Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No.
6634 [hereinafter 1956 Container Convention]; Customs Convention on Containers, Dec. 2,
1972, [1975] 988 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter 1972 Container Convention].
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
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jected each of Itel's constitutional arguments, and the Tennessee Supreme
Court affirmed. 6
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Itel's primary argument was that the
Tennessee sales tax was precluded by the 1956 Container Convention 7 and
the 1972 Container Convention.8 The Court rejected this argument, stating
that the Container Conventions disallowed only those taxes based on the act
of importation, not those taxes based on the mere presence of a container
within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority. 9 The Court further con-
cluded that indirect value added tax (VAT) placed on container leases by
other signatory nations to the Container Conventions was equivalent to Ten-
nessee's direct sales tax on container leases, and that neither type of tax was
a tax on importation prohibited by the Container Conventions. 10
The Court also rejected Itel's contention that the Tennessee sales tax was
preempted because it frustrated federal objectives under the Container Con-
ventions, and the laws and regulations granting favored status to interna-
tional containers." Instead, the Court determined that the federal
regulatory scheme for containers used in foreign commerce disclosed no con-
gressional intent to exempt those containers from domestic taxation. 12
Moreover, the Court determined that the Tennessee sales tax did not violate
the foreign commerce clause under the test set forth in Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles 13 and the import-export clause as interpreted by the
Court in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages. 14 The Court's decision thus reflects a
willingness to view favorably certain state efforts to impose tax on items that
many taxpayers hoped would not be taxable.
6. Itel, 113 S. Ct. at 1098-99.
7. 1956 Container Convention, supra note 3.
8. 1972 Container Convention, supra note 3.
9. Itel, 113 S. Ct. at 1100.
10. Id. at 1100-01.
11. Id. at 1103.
12. Id. at 1102.
13. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). As set forth in Japan Line, the two-part test to determine if a tax
violates the foreign commerce clause is "whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, cre-
ates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents
the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations
with foreign governments.' " 441 U.S. at 451. In applying this test to the sales tax at issue in
Itel, the Court found that Tennessee decided to tax a discrete transaction occurring within the
state and that it credited against its own tax any tax properly paid in another jurisdiction of the
same transactions, thereby reducing, if not eliminating, the risk of multiple international taxa-
tion. 113 S. Ct. at 1104-05. Likewise, the Court accepted the government's assertion that the
Tennessee sales tax did not prevent the government from speaking with one voice when regu-
lating commercial relations with other nations. Id. at 1105.
14. 423 U.S. 276 (1976). According to Michelin, the following factors must not be com-
promised in order for a tax not to violate the import-export clause: "the Federal Government
must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments,
and tariffs, which might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consis-
tent with that exclusive power; import revenues were to be the major source of revenue of the
Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and harmony among the States
might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited
from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing goods merely flowing through their




As is always the case for any given Survey period, several of the comptrol-
ler's administrative decisions are worth discussing in some detail. Decision
28,065,15 for example, considered whether certain expenditures incurred in
connection with a government contract were exempt from taxation. In par-
ticular, the taxpayer contended that certain software procured either from
inventories maintained by the government or from government supply
sources were not subject to Texas sales taxes. The taxpayer further claimed
that certain security, janitorial, and maintenance services associated with the
performance of the contract were also exempt from taxation.
With respect to the taxpayer's first contention, the comptroller agreed on
both constitutional and tax law grounds. Because the software was obtained
on behalf of the government and because title to the software vested directly
in the government at the time of acceptance, the purchase of the software
satisfied the requirements of both United States v. New Mexico.1 6 and Day &
Zimmermann, Inc. v. Calvert.17
With respect to the taxpayer's second contention, however, the comptrol-
ler distinguished between services that were inherently necessary to the per-
formance of the contract with the government and services that were
incidental to the contract in that they were not essential to the contract's
central mission. Under this analysis, the comptroller determined that the
security services were tax exempt, but the janitorial and maintenance serv-
ices were subject to taxation.' 8
Decision 28,27319 addressed the issue of whether certain work performed
on used aircraft piston engines should be considered tax-exempt processing
or taxable repairs, remodeling or maintenance. The taxpayer claimed that
because the items in question were used in the processing of aircraft piston
engine cylinders within six months of their purchase, they were exempt from
taxation under Section 151.31820 and Rule 3.300.21 The comptroller, how-
ever, determined that, under the facts presented, the taxpayer was perform-
ing repairs and/or remodeling and that the items purchased for use in
performing such services were taxable. 22
15. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,065 (Oct. 13, 1993).
16. 455 U.S. 720 (1982). In considering whether certain property that was purchased
pursuant to a government contract was exempt from taxation, the United States Supreme
Court held that "tax immunity is appropriate in only one circumstance: when the levy falls on
the United States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Govern-
ment that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the
activity being taxed is concerned." Id. at 735.
17. 519 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975) (holding that the purchases
by the contractor were exempt from taxation as sales for resale to the government).
18. Comptroller hearing No. 28,065 (Oct. 13, 1993). The comptroller noted that certain
maintenance services probably would have met the inherently necessary test, but that the tax-
payer had failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to which of the maintenance services
qualified for the tax exemption.
19. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,273 (Mar. 10, 1993).
20. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon 1992).
21. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300 (eff. Feb. 5, 1992, West Supp. 1993-94).
22. The services performed by the taxpayer were industrial, hard chrome plating, welding
and custom machining on aircraft piston engine cylinders. While the performance of these
services brought about chemical and physical changes to the cylinders, the cylinders continued
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Decision 28,74623 was one of several decisions to address the distinction
between maintenance services, and remodeling or repairs. In this decision,
the taxpayer convinced the comptroller that the periodic repainting of hotel
rooms should be considered maintenance rather than remodeling or repairs.
The taxpayer repainted its hotel rooms on a scheduled basis, painting the
rooms the same color they were painted before, even if the rooms did not
appear to require painting. Sandblasting and plastering, on the other hand,
were held to be taxable. This decision is noteworthy because it points out
that services listed in Rule 3.35724 as non-taxable are not exempt services,
and reiterates the standards for the taxpayer's burden of proof in a non-
exemption case.
Decision 29,29525 involved the issue of whether the installation of an
emergency exit in existing building constituted non-taxable new construc-
tion. The comptroller determined that when the existing tenant expanded
into adjacent office space, and required a fire exit be installed, the addition
constituted remodeling or modification of the building, a taxable service, and
not new construction. Since the building already existed and all the space
had at one point been finished out, the installation could not be considered
new construction.
Decision 27,971,26 a very controversial decision, disallowed a manufactur-
ing exemption for property that was used "in an operation one-or-more-steps
removed from the actual operation producing the property to be sold" on
the ground that such property was not "used or consumed in or during the
actual manufacturing," as required by Section 151.318. 27 Final resolution of
this issue appears to require judicial analysis, as the comptroller maintains
that his position is correct, notwithstanding a taxpayer victory in a case that
dealt with a similar issue. 28
Whereas Decision 28,46129 refused to acknowledge that a "taxes paid"
clause in a contract meant that sales taxes had been paid, Decision 29,79530
respected a taxes-paid clause that stated more explicitly that sales tax was
to perform the same function when the taxpayer's work was finished. As a result, the comp-
troller determined that this type of work did not meet the definition of processing set forth in
Rule 3.300. Id. § 3.300(a)(10).
23. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,746 (Feb. 23, 1993).
24. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357 (eff. Dec. 7, 1992, West Supp. 1993-94).
25. Comptroller Hearing No. 29,295 (Feb. 19, 1993).
26. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,971 (Mar. 8, 1993).
27. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon 1992).
28. Ecolochem v. Bullock, No. 492,269 (345 Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., July 2, 1993)
in which the Court permitted the exemption on analogous facts.
29. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,461 (Aug. 24, 1992) (holding that the lump-sum price
did not include sales tax even though the purchase order provided that price "includes labor,
materials and tax." The comptroller reasoned that neither the original price proposal nor any
invoices contained any reference to state taxes, and that references in the purchase order to the
inclusion of tax could relate either to the taxes the seller paid to its suppliers for materials used
on the job or to the tax that was due on the actual roofing job. Given these two possibilities,
the decision held that the language should be interpreted against the taxpayer because the
seller did not hold a sales tax permit.
30. Comptroller Hearing No. 29,795 (March 25, 1993).
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included. 31 In a decision that reflects a change in comptroller policy, Deci-
sion 27,509,32 the comptroller held that an increase in capacity is taxable
remodeling rather than non-taxable new construction. The administrative
law judge concluded that prior Taxability Responses and advice given to
taxpayers (which had generally held that construction work performed to
increase capacity is new construction when performed on refineries and
chemical plants) were incorrect. Significantly, the decision recommends that
the Tax Division assess and collect taxes from taxpayers who were not re-
quired to pay taxes on increased capacity remodeling, regardless of whether
the failure to pay tax was due to a Taxability Response, an audit, a refund
claim, or any other contact with the agency.
The taxpayer, an electric utility company, argued that the replacement of
a 24 kilowatt transmission line with a 69 kilowatt line should be considered
new construction because of the line's increased capacity. The administra-
tive law judge acknowledged that several Taxability Responses issued prior
to January 1, 1992 concluded that construction to increase capacity of refin-
eries and chemical plants is new construction, but he concluded that "there
does not appear to be any rational basis for treating these refineries and
chemical plants different than other industries," that the changes should not
be considered new construction, and that only a retroactive assessment and
collection of taxes due from taxpayers in these industries would remedy the
disparate treatment of similarly-situated taxpayers. 33 In struggling to avoid
treating similarly-situated taxpayers differently, the judge apparently chose
another evil: imposing a tax on taxpayers who may have relied to their det-
riment on previous written advice from the comptroller.
Finally, Decision 28,39134 proposed a new two-part test for determining
whether improvements made to a facility are for the primary use and benefit
of the lessee such that real property repair and remodeling services would be
exempt from taxation. First, the lessee must qualify for exempt status under
Section 151.30935 or Section 151.310 of the Texas Tax Code. 36 Second, the
lease should be long-term in that it has reasonable relationship to the life of
the improvements. If both of these conditions are met, the lessee will be the
party receiving the primary use and benefit of the improvements. 37
31. The contract provided for labor costs and material costs, each of which was to be
increased 8% for overhead and other costs, and then another 7% (the tax rate at the time of
the contract) to satisfy state sales tax requirements. Thus, the purchaser had adequate proof
that it had paid sales tax on the non-residential realty remodeling. A 1993 draft version of
Rule 3.291(b)(3)(A) provided that "[L]ump-sum contracts that contain language about taxes
such as 'contract sum includes all labor, material, taxes and permits,' will be regarded as taxes
the contractor owes and paid to suppliers and not sales or use taxes collected from the contrac-
tor's customer." Draft Rule 3.291(b)(4)(A) (June 1993) (dealing with separated contracts)
also addresses tax-paid clauses.
32. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,509 (Jan. 20, 1993).
33. Id.
34. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,391 (July 7, 1993).
35. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.309 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
36. Id. § 151.310.
37. Because this test is significantly different from the comptroller's prior interpretations,
the comptroller will likely be challenged if he attempts to deny exemptions under this test to
taxpayers who qualify for exemption under the prior interpretations.
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Other administrative decisions focused on computer services, 38 data
processing services,39 security services,4° as well as on what constitutes a
taxable sale.4 '
B. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Although the 73d Legislature enacted several laws affecting Texas sales
tax, these legislative changes are not generally as significant as in some other
recent years. The Texas Legislature focused more on refining existing au-
thority rather than on developing new criteria for dealing with sales tax
issues.
One of the most important statutory changes involves the sales tax treat-
ment of construction for tax-exempt entities. For the second straight legisla-
tive session, Section 151.311 of the Texas Tax Code42 was substantially
revised. Specifically, this section was amended to delete the previous exemp-
tion for equipment and machinery used in connection with the improvement
of realty for certain school districts and hospitals,43 and amended also to
include two exemptions for the purchase of tangible personal property and
an exemption for the purchase of tangible services in connection with a con-
tract to improve realty owned by an organization that is exempt from taxa-
tion under Sections 151.30944 or 151.310.45 The new exemptions for
tangible personal property provide that the purchase of tangible personal
property for use in the performance of a contract for improvement to realty
38. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 28,453 (Apr. 22, 1993) (consulting services pro-
vided in conjunction with software sales were not taxable; notes comptroller's difficulty in
distinguishing taxable technical support from non-taxable instruction); Comptroller Hearing
No. 29,703 (Apr. 20, 1993) (giving instructions with respect to software not taxable as sale of
computer programs, commenting on 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.308 (eff. Dec. 31, 1987, West
1987)); see also Comptroller Hearing No. 29,408 (Feb. 11, 1993) (no charge made for extensive
computer services, therefore no tax) (discussing burden of proof).
39. Comptroller Hearing No. 29,745 (Feb. 16, 1993) (individual's revisions to drafts, in-
cluding roughly 30% word processing services, were taxable data processing).
40. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 28,256 (Jan. 12, 1993) (taxpayer relief allowed,
based in part on unclear law and detrimental reliance).
41. See Comptroller Hearing No. 29,388 (Feb. 16, 1993) (promotional give-away items
not considered sold) (similar comptroller interpretation that mobile phones sold at low prices
are not "sold," and that they may therefore not be purchased for resale, has been the subject of
considerable discussion; see generally Tax Policy News Oct. 1993 at 4 and Dec. 1993 at 5); see
also Comptroller Hearing No. 28,901 (May 17, 1993) (analyzing TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.427 (Vernon 1992) and concluding that taxpayer's sale of tax-paid inventory for scrap
metal is a qualifying sale, notwithstanding the tax division's argument that it was not a sale in
the ordinary course of business); Comptroller Hearing No. 27,580 (June 22, 1993) (granting a
refund to a publisher of copyrighted telephone directories under rationale of Texas Monthly v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)); Comptroller Hearing No. 27,942 (Feb. 18, 1993) (discussing sales
in the context of supplying telephone directories).
42. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
43. Texas H.B. 85, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993). This bill amended Section 151.311 to delete the
exemption for equipment and machinery used to improve realty for certain school districts and
hospitals, and also contained a prior contract exemption for such equipment and machinery
purchased "subject to a written contract or bid entered into on or before the effective date of
this Act." This prior contract exemption has no effect after three years from October 1, 1993,
the effective date of the Act.
44. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.309 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
45. Id. § 151.310 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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of an exempt entity is exempt if it is incorporated into such realty in the
performance of the contract 46 and also that tangible personal property, other
than machinery or equipment and its replacement parts or accessories,
purchased for use in the performance of a contract with an exempt entity is
exempt if the property is necessary and essential for the performance of the
contract, 47 and the property is completely consumed at the job site.48 In
addition, the purchase of a taxable service for use in the performance of a
contract for improvement to realty for an exempt entity is exempt if the
service is performed at the job site and if the contract expressly requires the
specific service to be purchased by the person performing the contract, or the
service is integral to the performance of the contract. 49
The 73d Legislature also continued its efforts to criminalize various ac-
tions taken to avoid or evade taxes.50 As a result of the amendments to
Section 151.707,51 which formerly provided that a person committed an of-
fense by giving a resale certificate for property the person knew, at the time
of purchase, was purchased for use and not for resale, 52 an offense under this
section now specifically includes, inter alia, intentionally or knowingly mak-
ing a false entry in, or fraudulently altering an exemption or resale certifi-
cate, using an exemption certificate or resale certificate with knowledge that
it is false, and unreasonably impeding the availability of an exemption or
resale certificate.13 More significant, the amendments to Section 151.707
also impose tougher penalties on violations of the statute, and tie the dollar
amount of the tax avoided to the characterization of the offense.5 4
The Legislature also modified civil penalties. New Section 151.7031 estab-
lishes a civil penalty of $50.00 for any taxpayer who fails to file a timely tax
46. Id. § 151.311(a).
47. Id. Section 151.311 does not define "necessary and essential." However, Section
151.318 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994), which allows a sales tax exemption for certain property
used or consumed in a manufacturing process, uses the term "necessary or essential" to deter-
mine whether the purchase of tangible personal property used or consumed in the manufactur-
ing process is exempt. Several administrative decisions concerning the manufacturing
exemption appear to use "necessary or essential" and "necessary and essential"
interchangeably.
48. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
49. Id. § 151.311(c).
50. The emphasis on tougher legislation for tax fraud is not new. In 1991, for example,
the Texas Legislature added Section 171.363 to the Tax Code to impose criminal penalties for
certain willful and fraudulent acts in the context of franchise tax reporting. Tex. Tax Code
Ann. § 171.363 (Vernon 1992). See also Wisenbaker v. State, 860 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1993, pet. ref'd) (prosecuting for failure to remit motor fuel taxes).
51. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.707 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
52. Act effective Jan. 1, 1982, 67th Leg. R.S., ch. 389, § 151.707, Tex. Gen. Laws 1490,
1583, amended by, Act of May 24, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 486, § 1.09, Tex. Gen. Laws 1900,
1903.
53. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.707(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
54. Under the new statutory framework, the greater the amount of the tax avoided, the
tougher the penalty. For example, if the tax avoided by the use of the fraudulent exemption or
resale certificate is less than $20, the offense is a Class C misdemeanor; however, if the tax
avoided is $20,000 or more, the offense is a felony. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.707(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1994). Former law merely provided that an offense under this section was a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $500.
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report on three separate occasions. 55 This penalty is assessed against the
taxpayer even though the reports are subsequently filed and no taxes are due
in connection therewith. 5
6
The 73d Legislature also had occasion to address the taxability of certain
types of services, adding Section 151.350 to the Texas Tax Code expressly
providing that separately-stated labor charges for repair of real or tangible
personal property damaged within a disaster 57 area by the condition that
caused the area to be declared a disaster area5" is exempt from sales or use
tax. The exemption does not apply to tangible personal property transferred
as part of the repair.5 9
Section 151.058, 60 which formerly provided that a person performing tax-
able repair services was the consumer of machinery and equipment used to
perform such services, 6' now provides that all taxable services, not just re-
pair services, are included within the coverage of the provision62 and that the
total amount charged for a taxable service is taxable, regardless of whether
the charges are separately identified to the purchaser of the service.
63
The occasional sale exemption, Section 151.304, 64 was narrowed to pro-
vide that a person who holds a sales tax permit and who makes a purchase
from a person who could qualify for an exemption under Section
151.304(b)(1)65 is nonetheless required to accrue use tax on the sales transac-
tion, and to remit such tax to the comptroller. 66 Therefore, even if the seller
can qualify for exemption, the transaction will not be exempt with respect to
the purchaser.
Another noteworthy amendment, to Section 151.310,67 allows an organi-
zation, exempt under Section 151.310(a)(1) 68 or Section 151.310(a)(2), 69 to
55. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.7031 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
56. Id.
57. Disaster area is defined to mean an area declared a disaster area by the governor of the
State of Texas under Chapter 418 of the Texas Government Code or by the President of the
United States under Section 5141 of Title 42 of the United States Code. Id. § 151.350(c). The
authority of the President to declare an area a disaster area is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 5191
(Supp. 1993).
58. Id. § 151.350(a). This legislation raises interesting issues for some taxpayers because
the statutory exemption is narrower in some respects than the pre-existing comptroller policy.
59. Id. § 151.350(b).
60. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.058 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
61. Act of July 20, 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 5, art. 1, pt. 4, § 18, Tex. Gen Laws 9,
15, amended by Act of May 26, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 1031, § 20, Tex. Gen. Laws 4440,
4444.
62. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.058(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
63. Id. § 151.058(b).
64. Id. § 151.304.
65. Id. § 151.304(b)(1) (Vernon 1992). This subsection provides an exemption from taxa-
tion for "one or two sales of taxable items, other than an amusement service, at retail during a
12-month period by a person who does not habitually engage, or hold himself out as engaging,
in the business of selling taxable items at retail." Id. Regardless of the number of sales, a
seller may not qualify for this exemption if the seller holds a sales tax permit. Id. § 151.304(0.
66. Id. § 151.304(g).
67. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.310(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
68. Id. § 151.310(a)(1).
69. Id. § 151.310(a)(2).
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hold two (rather than one) one-day tax-free sales or auctions during a calen-
dar year.
The Legislature also amended statutes affecting very specific types of ac-
tivities, including those involved with customs brokers, 70 components of an
underground irrigation system exclusively used or employed on a farm or
ranch in the production of certain agricultural products to be sold in the
regular course of business, 7' and qualified hotel projects. 72 Additionally,
Section 151.40 173 was amended to provide for a one-time acceleration of the
time for payment of certain taxes. 74 As a final example, the sales tax exemp-
tion for a non-resident's aircraft purchase is more restrictive than under
prior law.7"
C. REGULATORY UPDATE
For several years, the comptroller has agreed that the exemption for prior
contracts 76 is available for a two-party transaction. The comptroller, how-
ever, has promulgated a proposed revision to Rule 3.3 1977 intended to deny
prior contract relief to two-party contracts. The comptroller argues, relying
on Calvert v. British-American Oil Producing Co.,78 that the prior contract
rule is intended to protect a supplier who was obligated to supply goods to a
seller who had already contracted with its buyer, and does not apply to two-
party contracts. However, this change in policy should be challenged, par-
ticularly in view of the comptroller's statement with respect to a prior ver-
70. Section 151.157 was added to the Texas Tax Code to set forth the procedures pursu-
ant to which a customs broker may issue documentation for the purpose of showing the ex-
emption of tangible personal property exported beyond the territorial limits of the United
States. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.157 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Similarly, Section 151.158 calls
for the development by the comptroller of export stamps to be attached to export documenta-
tion. Id. § 151.158. In addition, under Section 151.159, the comptroller may authorize a cus-
toms broker to refund certain taxes collected by the customs broker. Id. § 151.159.
71. Id. § 151.316(b).
72. Id. § 151.429(h) (providing for a rebate of 100% of the sales and use taxes paid or
collected by the qualified hotel project, and 100% of the taxes paid by persons using the hotel
for the first seven years the hotel is open).
73. Id. § 151.401.
74. Specifically, a taxpayer who pays by electronic funds transfer must pay all taxes im-
posed on the sale, use, storage or other consummation of taxable items between August 1st and
August 15th on or before August 20th unless the taxpayer qualifies as a quarterly filer, the
taxpayer prepays the tax on a quarterly basis or the comptroller waives the acceleration re-
quirement for all taxpayers. Id. § 151.401(a). Likewise, the tax reports due in connection with
these taxes will also be due on or before August 20th. Id. § 151.402(b). Section 151.401 is
effective on September 1, 1994, and expires January 1, 1996. Act of May 24, 1993, 73d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 486, § 2.04, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1900, 1907. As a result of these dates, the only
period of time in which this acceleration provision will be in effect is August 1995.
75. Id. § 151.328(f).
76. A prior contract is one that is signed before any change in the tax rate or the tax base.
34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319(a)(3) (eff. Nov. 6, 1990, West Supp. 1993-94). In general,
taxable items purchased or rented for use in or sold pursuant to the performance of prior
contracts are exempted from the amount of the increase in tax or change in the tax base. Id.
§ 3.319(b).
77. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319 (prop. Aug. 31, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 5831).
78. 397 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. 1965) ("It is clear that the exemption statute means that
the written contract therein referred to must be one between the purchaser and a third party
and not between the seller and the purchaser.").
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sion of Rule 3.319 that the rule "applies to two-party contracts as well as to
traditional three-party contracts" 79 and the apparent lack of legislative au-
thority for the proposed change. 80 The exclusion of two-party contracts
from the prior contract exemption, the most significant change in Proposed
Rule 3.319,81 is particularly noteworthy since the exclusion is to be applied
retroactively.
The comptroller revised Rule 3.333 governing security services 82 to delete
the distinction between guard services, surveillance, armored car services
and courier services. Furthermore, the revision modified a subsection on
temporary security services, and discussed a multistate benefit of services.
8 3
The comptroller drafted revisions to the rule on information services 84 in
an apparent effort to restrict the definition of non-taxable proprietary infor-
mation services,85 and revised Rules 3.28586 and 3.287,87 governing resale
certificates and exemption certificates, respectively. The stated purpose for
the revisions was compliance with the recent amendments to Section
151.70788 that set forth the new penalties for intentionally or knowingly is-
suing invalid resale or exemption certificates. 89 The revised rules also in-
clude revised forms of resale certificate and exemption certificates.
The comptroller also proposed revisions to a number of other rules, in-
cluding Rule 3.296, which deals with the exemption for tangible personal
property installed as a part of an underground irrigation system on farms
and ranches. 90 This proposed amendment, like the proposed amendment to
Rule 3.297 that provided a new procedure for claiming a sales tax exemption
when purchasing an aircraft for registration and use outside Texas, addresses
legislative changes made during the Survey period. 9'
Changes were also made, inter alia, to rules on imports and exports,92
79. 13 Tex. Reg. 1340 (Mar. 18, 1988) (prop. amend. to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319).
80. When the comptroller promulgated Rule 3.319 in 1987 (eff. Aug. 5, 1987, 12 Tex.
Reg. 2431), the rule pointed to several factors that would disqualify contracts from prior ex-
emptions. In the ensuing years, several disqualifying factors have been held invalid; the new
two-party restriction is also likely to be challenged in the administrative hearing process.
81. Other changes to be made by the proposed rule include deleting the requirement that
both parties sign the contract, allowing the prior contract exemption to apply to contracts with
open price terms, and deleting the statement that notice of prior contracts or bids should not
be sent to the comptroller. See 18 Tex. Reg. 5831 (Aug. 31, 1993).
82. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.333 (proposed Aug. 3, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 5059).
83. Id. § 3.333.
84. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.342 (West Supp. 1993-94).
85. This draft is based in part on Comptroller Hearing No. 27,621 (proposed July 1993),
in which the administrative law judge held that mailing lists were not proprietary since they
could be resold to others, and because clients for whom the mailing lists were prepared had no
contractual control over the lists. The judge then recommended that the agency review and
reconsider its rule, particularly the validity of § 3.342(d).
86. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285 (eff. Dec. 28, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 9311).
87. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.287 (eff. Dec. 28, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 9312).
88. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.707 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
89. See Section I.B. supra for further discussion of the statutory changes.
90. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.296 (eff. Dec. 28, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 9312).
91. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (eff. Dec. 28, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 9312).
92. Id. § 3.323 (eff. Jan. 1, 1993, West Supp. 1993-94).
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transfers of common interests in property and of intercorporate services,93
and customs brokers. 94 Consistent with the attention focused this year on
construction issues, the comptroller also revised the rule on labor relating to
residential property and nonresidential real property repair, remodeling, res-
toration, maintenance, new construction, and residential property.95
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. LIABILITY FOR TAX - DOING BUSINESS IN TEXAS
As state governments continually strive to increase revenue, the threshold
for nexus for taxation continues to be the subject of frequent litigation.
Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission 96 illustrates one state's suc-
cessful effort to tax income received by a corporation that licenses intangible
rights within the taxing jurisdiction. In the wake of Geoffrey, the comptrol-
ler has already indicated his intent to assert taxing jurisdiction over corpora-
tions that license certain intangibles in Texas.97
Comptroller representatives had announced as early as October 1993 that
the comptroller would adopt a new rule, to be effective January 1, 1994, that
would state that licensing intangibles in Texas would, under certain circum-
stances, constitute a nexus within Texas for franchise tax purposes.
Although initial oral comments from comptroller representatives indicated
that such licensing rights would create nexus only for purposes of the taxable
capital component of the tax, subsequent comments indicated that such li-
censing would give rise to nexus for both the taxable earned surplus and the
taxable capital components of the tax. Although significant questions exist
concerning the validity of such a rule, its imminent promulgation merits an
overview of Geoffrey.
Geoffrey, a wholly-owned, second-tier subsidiary of Toys R Us, with no
employees, offices or tangible property in South Carolina, contracted to pro-
vide Toys R Us with the right to use the Toys R Us trade name, as well as
certain other rights, including the right to use Geoffrey's merchandising
skills and "know-how" in connection with the promotion, advertising and
sale of products covered by the licensing agreement. The plaintiff in Geof-
frey asserted that the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause pre-
cluded South Carolina from taxing the royalty income that Geoffrey
93. Id. § 3.331 (eff. Feb. 10, 1993, West Supp. 1993-94).
94. Id. § 3.360 (eff. Jan. 1, 1993, West Supp. 1993-94).
95. Id. § 3.357 (eff. Dec. 7, 1992, West Supp. 1993-94). See also 18 Tex. Reg. 8339 (Nov.
12, 1993) (proposed amendment to Rule 3.392, concerning exemption for labor to repair tangi-
ble personal property damaged within a disaster area).
96. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3374 (Nov. 29, 1993).
97. According to the November 1993 issue of the Texas Comptroller's Tax Policy News:
Effective January 1, 1994, a corporation licensing intangibles (for example, trade
names, trademarks, logos, marketing plans, patents copyrights and software) in
Texas will have nexus in Texas for franchise tax purposes. In other words, Jan-
uary 1, 1994, will be the earliest date that a corporation will be considered doing
business in Texas solely because it is licensing intangibles in Texas.
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received for the licenses. 98 The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded,
however, that the nexus requirement of the Due Process Clause can be satis-
fied even when a corporation has no physical presence in the taxing state,
that Geoffrey had a franchise as well as an account receivable in South Caro-
lina (because Toys R Us sales gave rise to an account receivable for Geof-
frey), and that "the real source of Geoffrey's income is not a paper
agreement, but South Carolina's Toys R Us customers." 99 Based in part on
these findings, the court concluded that taxing Geoffrey's income from in-
tangibles did not violate Geoffrey's Due Process rights. According to the
court: "By electing to license its trademarks and trade names for use by
Toys R Us in many states, Geoffrey contemplated and purposefully sought
the benefit of economic contact with those states."''° The court rejected
Geoffrey's claim that it has not purposefully directed its activities toward
South Carolina's economic forum, and held that Geoffrey's licensing in-
tangibles for use in South Carolina and receiving income in exchange for
their use, was sufficient to meet the "minimum connection" with the taxing
state required by the Due Process Clause.' 0' Similarly, the court held that
taxation of Geoffrey's royalty income was not prohibited by the Commerce
Clause. ' 0 2
Followed to its logical extreme, the Geoffrey rationale would allow states
to argue that book authors, clothing manufacturers, and others are subject to
tax if their products are sold in the state, notwithstanding the remote, tenu-
ous ties that connect the "sellers" to the taxing state. Recognizing the weak-
ness of such an overly-broad approach, the comptroller has indicated his
attempt to draft a rule that would encompass the Geoffrey rationale without
being so clearly over-broad that it becomes subject to judicial challenge and
also impossible to administer.
Several comptroller letters and informal interpretations further exemplify
the comptroller's nexus analysis. In one case, for example, the comptroller
concluded that a seller of a service that provides access to third-party data
bases, by supplying its customers with seller-owned software in Texas that
enabled the customers to access the corporation's gateway and thus the
third-party data bases, creates nexus in Texas for the seller.'0 3 The comp-
troller also continues to assert that, under certain circumstances, a company
may establish nexus in Texas when an affiliate of the company performs ac-
tions in Texas on behalf of the company.' °4 On the other hand, the comp-
98. The royalty was one percent of net sales of licensed products or services sold under
the licensed trademark.
99. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 16.
102. Id. at 18.
103. Tax Policy News, Feb. 1993 at 5 (summarizing 1217E07).
104. Comptroller representatives have also indicated their position that a holding company
that does nothing but hold stock of companies that do business in Texas is likely to be consid-
ered as doing business in Texas if it has even minimal connection (e.g., a bank account in
Texas) with the state. The comptroller argues that a corporation must be somewhere, and that
if it is not outside Texas, it must be doing business in Texas. However, Texas law does not
appear to support such a broad principle.
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troller decided not to contend that a limited partner's interest in a
partnership doing business in Texas is sufficient to create a nexus with
Texas. 105
B. CALCULATION AND ALLOCATION OF TAXABLE CAPITAL AND
EARNED SURPLUS
The criteria for calculating taxable surplus continue to be the focus of
several administrative hearings and court cases, as taxpayers attempt to ex-
clude from surplus, inter alia, post-retirement life and medical benefits, 10 6
operating lease obligations, 10 7 and pre-acquisition earnings of acquired sec-
ond-tier subsidiaries.'0 8 At the core of many of these issues is the comptrol-
ler's expansive view of "surplus" coupled with a narrow definition of "debt"
under Section 171.109(a)(3).10 9
Other decisions based on the comptroller's analysis hold that prepaid ex-
penses may not be excluded from surplus 110 and that a write-off of goodwill
is not permitted."I' The decision on goodwill is particularly interesting be-
cause of the administrative law judge's comment that Rule 3.405(e)(9), 112
which permits a write-off of assets that reflect a permanent decline in asset
value, resulting from a specifically identifiable event, appears to be in conflict
with the relevant statute."13
In summarizing the "throwback" rule, under which receipts from out-of-
state sales are treated as Texas receipts if the seller is not subject to tax in the
105. Although there is no guarantee that the comptroller will maintain this policy, the
policy is consistent with promulgated regulations. (See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.546(c)(12)(B) (eff. Mar. 16, 1992, West Supp. 1993-94). In the absence of legislation, it is
doubtful that the comptroller has authority to change this long-standing policy. Indeed,
comptroller representatives have indicated that the comptroller is likely to seek legislation in
1995 that would treat such a limited partner as having a nexus with Texas.
106. See, e.g., Arkla v. Sharp, No. 93-02966 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.); pending
(taxpayer excludes benefits as debt within the meaning of TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.109(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
107. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 25,549, 26,676 (Feb. 23, 1993). Several pending
court cases focus on this issue.
108. See Harken Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Sharp, No. 91-19926 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County,
Tex., May 27, 1993) (granting state's motion for summary judgment contending that pre-ac-
quisition earnings of second-tier subsidiaries may not be deducted from surplus, notwithstand-
ing State v. Sun Refining & Marketing, Inc., 740 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ
denied) (holding that a taxpayer may subtract pre-acquisition earnings of a subsidiary
corporation)).
109. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(a)(3) (Vernon 1992).
110. Comptroller Hearing No. 29,834 (Feb. 16, 1993).
Ill. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,743, 17,916 (Mar. 15, 1993).
112. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405(e)(9) (West 1987); see 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.551(e)(10) (eff. Nov. I1, 1992, West Supp. 1993-94) for the current version of this rule.
113. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109. See also Comptroller Hearing No. 25,549; 26,676
(Feb. 23, 1993), that also questions the validity of this rule. This hearing allowed the taxpayer
utility company to amend its franchise tax returns to change from straight-line depreciation to
another GAAP-permitted method, but denied taxpayer's exclusion from surplus of an




other state, 114 the comptroller has indicated that, for taxable capital pur-
poses, if an officer of a Texas corporation lives in another state and manages
the Texas corporation that state, the throwback rule does not apply."'
As in the past, there were few reported franchise tax decisions, although
unreported judicial decisions and administrative decisions continue to offer
guidance on some issues. 116
In a significant taxpayer victory, Decision Nos. 27,377 and 27,378"17 held
that the comptroller could not require the corporate taxpayer to use push-
down accounting on the facts of that case. The decision points out that the
GAAP did not require the particular taxpayer to use push-down accounting
and that, since the relevant statute"I8 requires only that GAAP principles be
employed by the claimant, the comptroller may not by rule' 19 limit the tax-
payer to only one GAAP principle.' 2 0 The Legislature has since provided
that taxpayers may not use push-down accounting. 12'
The primary administrative guidance from the comptroller on the calcula-
tion and allocation of taxable earned surplus continues to be regulations and
informal guidance, since no administrative hearings published during the
survey period address the methodology of the earned surplus calculations.
C. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Although the 1993 Survey period saw fewer, and less dramatic, regulatory
changes than the preceding year, several proposed new and amended rules
merit mention. The comptroller is again working to refine Texas' definition
of nexus for franchise tax purposes, and has proposed replacing the current
three-paragraph rule 122 with a significantly longer, more detailed rule 123 that
attempts to set forth more specific guidance on the circumstances in which
Public Law 86-272124 will shield a taxpayer from the earned surplus compo-
nent of the Texas franchise tax. The comptroller acknowledges that certain
114. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549 (Nov. 13, 1992). See also id. § 3.557 (Nov. 13, 1992)
(Earned Surplus: Apportionment).
115. Tax Policy News, May 1993 at 4 (summarizing Taxability Response 1319).
116. Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Sharp, No. 91-7397 (331st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.,
agreed judgment Sept. 2. 1993), for example, was one of several cases in which taxpayers
challenged the irrevocable election requirement of 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391 and reached
a pro-taxpayer agreed judgment with the state.
117. Comptroller Hearing Nos. 27,377, 27,378 (Mar. 24, 1993).
118. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109 (Vernon 1992).
119. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.547(d)(3) (eff. Mar. 16, 1992, West Supp. 1993-94).
120. Several district court cases on push-down accounting were also resolved by agreedjudgments. See, e.g., Belco Dev. Corp. v. Bullock, No. 446,650 (250th Dist Ct., Travis
County, Tex., July 7, 1993).
121. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. The comptroller continues to assert that,
even for taxpayers required under old law to use push-down accounting, negative push-down
accounting is not permitted.
122. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.554 (eff. Mar. 16, 1992, West Supp. 1993-94).
123. See 18 Tex. Reg. 5652 (1993) (proposing the repeal of current § 3.554 and the adop-
tion of the new version).
124. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84(1988)). See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, 1993 Survey at 1811-12 for a brief overview of Pub. L. 86-
272, which prohibits state income taxes on certain, protected solicitations.
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de minimis non-solicitation activities will not preclude a taxpayer from rely-
ing on the protection offered by Public Law 86-272, but the comptroller pre-
dictably attempts to limit the scope of activities that are considered de
minimis. 125
The comptroller has also proposed an amendment to Rule 3.558,126 con-
cerning officer and director compensation to be included in earned surplus,
adding references to newly-created limited banking associations. Proposed
new Rule 3.562127 includes comptroller guidelines for determining the taxa-
ble capital and earned surplus of limited liability companies. The rule pro-
vides that to the extent a limited liability company allocates income and
deductions to its members for federal income tax purposes, those items will
be treated as income and deductions in determining the earned surplus of the
limited liability company as though it were taxed as a corporation for federal
income tax purposes.12 8 Additional, specific rules are also provided with
respect to dividend income received by a limited liability company.129 Inter-
estingly, the draft rule provides that some federal income tax requirements
and limitations apply in calculating earned surplus, 30 but that other federal
income tax requirements and limitations are ignored.' 3' The proposed rule
contains other provisions that appear to be result-oriented, such as the provi-
sion that a one-person limited liability company may not deduct officer and
director compensation from earned surplus. 132 The proposed rule further
provides that a corporate member's distributive share of a limited liability
company's items of income or loss is not included in either the gross receipts
or the earned surplus of a corporate member of a limited liability company,
to the extent the items would have been reported at the limited liability com-
pany level. 133
The comptroller has also proposed amendments to the rule dealing with
Enterprise Zones 134 and new rules dealing with regulated investment compa-
nies' 35 and with provisional exemption certificates for corporations waiting
for an Internal Revenue Service Ruling on exempt status. 136
125. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.554 (c)(3) (prop. Aug. 24, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 5652),
defining de minimis activities as "those that, when taken together, establish only a trivial con-
nection with Texas," and providing that if activity either qualitatively or quantitatively creates
a non-trivial connection, "then the activity exceeds the protection of Pub. L. 86-72." The
proposed rule also includes 21 examples of activities that constitute doing business in Texas if
they are not of a de minimis level.
126. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558 (eff. Sept. 29, 1992, West Supp. 1993-94); id. (pro-
posed Nov. 12, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 8343).
127. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562 (prop. Nov. 12, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 8346).
128. Id. § (d).
129. Id. § (d)(4).
130. See, e.g., id. § (d)(1).
131. See id. § (d)(2).
132. Id. § (g).
133. Id. § (h)(2)(A).
134. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.561 (prop. Nov. 12, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 8345).
135. Id. § 3.564 (prop. Nov. 12, 1993, 18 Tex. Reg. 8347).




Fearful that taxpayers would be awarded substantial refunds based on the
rationale of Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation,1 37 the comp-
troller successfully sought a legislative change designed to bar such refunds.
(In Allied-Signal, the Supreme Court held that New Jersey could not include
in apportionable income for state tax purposes the gain that the taxpayer had
received from the sale of a minority interest in an unrelated, non-unitary
business.)138 The comptroller's shield against Allied-Signal refund claims
took the form of a new section to the Tax Code 139 that provides that the
comptroller may allocate all of certain intangible income, excluding interest
and dividends, to Texas if the corporation's commercial domicile is in Texas
and the income cannot otherwise be taxed. 14° This legislative change at-
tracted remarkably little attention during the legislative session, given that it
purports to abrogate, in limited circumstances, Texas' well-established loca-
tion of payor rule.' 4' The new statutory language is particularly troubling
because it relies on concepts (like "insufficient unitary connection") which
are ambiguous at best and which find no interpretation under current Texas
law. 142
Faced with significant taxpayer concerns that new Section 171.1061 would
be used to allocate stock sale receipts to Texas, the comptroller has provided
taxpayers with limited assurances that most income would be "presumed"
unitary, and that the comptroller's efforts would focus more on sourcing
"nowhere income" to Texas than on sourcing income to Texas in other
circumstances. 143
137. 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992). See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1803, 1814 (1993).
138. 112 S. Ct. at 2264.
139. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1061 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
140. Specifically, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1061 provides:
An item of income included in a corporation's taxable earned surplus, except
that portion derived from dividends and interest, that a state, other than this
state, or a country, other than the United States, cannot tax because the activi-
ties generating that item of income do not have sufficient unitary connection
with the corporation's other activities conducted within that state or country
under the United States Constitution, is allocated to this state if the corpora-
tion's commercial domicile is in this state. Income that can only be allocated to
the state of commercial domicile because the income has insufficient unitary
connection with any other state or country shall be allocated to this state or
another state or country net of expenses related to that income. A portion of a
corporation's taxable earned surplus allocated to this state under this section
may not be apportioned under Section 171.1 10(a)(2).
141. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.549(e)(13) and 3.557(e)(13) (eff. Nov. 13, 1992, West
Supp. 1993-94) (providing that receipts from dividends, interest and other intangibles are gen-
erally allocated to the location [for a corporation, state of incorporation] of the payor). The
comptroller has also indicated his intent to treat certain sales of partnership interest as outside
the location of payor test, on the ground that such sales should be taxed as asset sales rather
than as sales of an intangible partnership interest.
142. The frequently-heard explanation that this provision will be used to tax "nowhere
income" fails to answer serious interpretative questions concerning how to determine what is
unitary in this context, what is an "item of income," and which expenses are "related to"
income.
143. As of the end of the survey period, the comptroller had not yet revised 34 TEX. AD-
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The Legislature also modified the definition of "gross receipts" for earned
surplus purposes: as revised, Section 171.1121144 provides that "gross re-
ceipts" does not include revenues, like Schedule C special deductions, that
are not included in earned surplus.1 45 This section therefore makes explicit
the comptroller's interpretation that dividends among members of an affili-
ated group, if excluded from taxable income for federal income tax purposes,
may not be included in calculating the percentage of the recipient corpora-
tion's receipts that are allocable to Texas.
Among other changes,1 4 6 the Legislature prohibited push-down account-
ing, 147 provided that Texas chartered savings banks and limited banking as-
sociations are subject to franchise tax 148 and modified the throwback rule for
earned surplus calculations. 149
The statutory provision imposing an "additional tax" on a corporation
that ceases to be subject to the earned surplus component of the tax was
modified to state that the additional tax applies "without regard to whether
the corporation remains subject to tax."150
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF TAX
A host of opinions during the Survey period addressed the agricultural
land and qualified open-space land exemptions. (Agricultural and open-
space land are entitled to special appraisal according to productive capacity
rather than fair market value.)' 51 In Tarrant Appraisal District v. Moore 152
the Supreme Court of Texas held that the trial court properly instructed the
jury that use of land principally for recreational purposes or as a hobby does
MIN. CODE § 3.554 (Earned Surplus: Nexus) to take into account this new statute. The comp-
troller has previously considered recommending that Texas adopt some form of a unitary or
combined reporting system. If he intends to make such a recommendation for the future, he
may determine that it would not be in the state's best interests to adopt an overly narrow
definition of "unitary."
144. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1121 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
145. Id.
146. For proof that budget and politics create interesting law, see new TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 171.651-57 and TEX. Gov'T CODE §§ 497.009-10; 497.022 creating a credit against
franchise taxes for certain wages paid to prison inmates.
147. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(m) (Vernon Supp. 1994). This change brings
the state full circle on this issue. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
148. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
149. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1032 (Vernon Supp. 1994). The section now states ex-
plicitly that the criteria is whether the seller is subject to tax in another jurisdiction "without
regard to whether the tax is imposed." Id.
150. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0011(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994). This change is intended
to address taxpayer arguments that the additional tax does not apply to a corporation that is
no longer subject to either the taxable capital component of the tax or the earned surplus
component. Another change in this statute is to provide that the tax is due "on the 60th day"
after the corporation is no longer subject to the tax rather than being delinquent after sixty
days. Id. § 171.0011(c) (emphasis added). The prior wording could allow taxpayers to argue
that corporations could liquidate within sixty days of January 1, 1994, but pay tax before the
60th day, to avoid being bound by the law as in effect on January 1, 1994.
151. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 23.57, 23.52 (Vernon 1992).
152. 845 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1993).
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not qualify as agricultural use. 15 3 In order for land to qualify as open-space
land, among other requirements, it must be currently and principally de-
voted to agricultural use to the degree of intensity generally accepted in the
area. 5 4 In reversing the court of appeals, the court reasoned that land can-
not be principally devoted to agricultural use if it is also used principally for
recreational purposes or as a hobby. 155
In a landmark decision, the Texas Supreme Court in HL Farm Corp. v.
Self 5 6 held that Section 23.56(3) of the Tax Code,'57 which denies open-
space land valuation to property owned by a legal entity owned primarily by
a nonresident alien or foreign government if such entity is required by fed-
eral law to register its ownership of the land,15 8 is unconstitutional. In re-
versing the Dallas Court of Appeals, 159 the court reasoned that the
classification created in Section 23.56(3) is not rationally related to the pur-
pose of the open-space land exemption (which is to promote land devoted to
farm or ranch purposes), and, therefore, violates the equal protection clause
of the Texas Constitution.160 The court concluded that the preservation of
open-space land is based on use, not on ownership, and that there is simply
no rational basis for denying an open-space land designation to a foreign
entity. '61
The Attorney General in Opinion No. DM-18816 2 addressed the public
purpose test, which is another highly litigated issue. Pursuant to Section
11.11 of the Tax Code, property owned by the state or its political subdivi-
sion is generally exempt from property tax if the property is used for public
purposes. 1 63 Unfortunately, Texas courts have not developed a completely
adequate definition of public purpose. In general, courts have held that the
test for public purpose is whether the public property is used primarily for
the health, comfort and welfare of the public.1'
In this ruling, the Attorney General addressed whether a city-owned air-
craft hangar leased to a private entity to be used for maintenance and storage
of its aircraft meets the public purpose test. The Attorney General recog-
153. Id. at 823.
154. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.51(1) (Vernon 1992).
155. Moore, 845 S.W.2d at 823. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied heavily on
guidelines published by the State Property Tax Board (whose duties were taken over by the
Comptroller in 1991), which provided that property used primarily for recreational use does
not qualify as open-space land. See State Property Tax Board, Guidelines for the Valuation of
Agricultural Land (1988).
156. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 321 (1994).
157. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 24.56(3) (Vernon 1992).
158. Id.
159. See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 2093,
2116 (1992) (discussing the Dallas Court of Appeals' decision in HL Farm).
160. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
161. HL Farm, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. at 322. This decision conflicts with Alexander Ranch v.
Central Appraisal Dist., 733 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, writ refd n.r.e.). Fur-
thermore, the court provided that it disapproves of the holding in Alexander Ranch to the
extent its holding conflicts with HL Farm.
162. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-188 (1992).
163. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11(a) (Vernon 1992).
164. A&M Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Bryan, 184 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1945).
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nized that the Municipal Airports Act 16 5 broadly declares that the develop-
ment and operation of airports are public purposes, and reasoned that the
hangar must be used in the direct support of the airport in order to be used
for a public purpose. 166 The Attorney General did not reach a conclusion
with respect to whether the hangar at issue was used for a public purpose
because he viewed the issue one of fact; however, he ruled that if most of the
aircraft stored and serviced at the hangar would be brought there solely for
maintenance and storage and would not be engaged in the transport of pas-
sengers or cargo to or from the airport, then the hangar would not meet the
public purpose test. 167
The San Antonio Court of Appeals in Nueces County Appraisal District v.
Diamond Refining and Marketing Co. 168 held that crude oil temporarily
stored in the county after foreign importation was not exempt from property
tax. 169 The oil was shipped from outside the country to the county, where it
remained in storage tanks for no more than 25 days until it was delivered to
the taxpayer's refinery, which was also located in Texas. The taxpayer as-
serted that the oil was in transit and immune from property taxes under both
the Import-Export Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United State
Constitution. The critical issue with respect to the Import-Export Clause
was whether the tax violated the third purpose of the Import-Export Clause,
as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Michelin Tire,170 that
harmony among the states might be disturbed unless the seaboard states
were prohibited from taxing citizens of other states by taxing goods merely
flowing through their ports to the inland states. 17 1 Because the oil's final
destination was a Texas refinery, the court reasoned that the tax had no
effect on the cost of property moving to inland states. 172 In addressing the
Commerce Clause, the court relied on the tests employed in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady 173 and Japan Line.174 The primary issue examined by
the court relative to the Commerce Clause was whether the tax violated the
requirement under Japan Line that the tax not enhance the risk of multiple
taxation on the item taxed. The court reasoned that there was no risk of
multiple taxation given that, upon entering the United States, the oil is sub-
ject to tax only in Texas, and only in the county in which it has its taxable
165. In TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-15 (Vernon 1969 and Supp. 1994). Indeed,
the Attorney General ruled in 1986 that, as a matter of law, a city's airport facilities which are
leased to a private entity are used for a public purpose. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-464
(1986).
166. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-188 (1992). Apparently, property used to support the
city's safe and efficient operation of the airport meets this "direct support" test. Id.
167. Id. It is not clear from the Attorney General's opinion, however, whether the cargo
and passengers need to be public cargo and public passengers in order for the public property
exemption to apply.
168. 853 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ granted).
169. Id. at 218.
170. 423 U.S. 276 (1976); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
171. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 285-86.
172. Nueces County, 853 S.W.2d at 216.
173. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).




The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in General Electric Capital Corp. v.
City of Corpus Christi 176 held that a taxpayer which repossessed certain mo-
bile homes was liable for property taxes on such homes, irrespective of
whether the taxpayer possessed legal title to such homes. 177 The court con-
cluded that property tax may be imposed not only on those possessing legal
title to property, but also on persons possessing property or having a supe-
rior right of possession.' 78 In this case, the court believed that the taxpayer,
after obtaining foreclosure or possession, became the tax owner of the prop-
erty at issue. 179
B. PROCEDURE
The Dallas Court of Appeals' decision in Collin County Appraisal District
v. Northeast Dallas Associates 180 is yet another example that taxpayers are
generally required to follow strictly the property tax statutes in order to be
entitled to an exemption. Northeast Dallas Associates addressed the scope of
Section 25.25(c)(1) of the Tax Code,' 8' that allows rolls to be corrected for
clerical errors. In this case, the taxpayer applied to the appraisal district
requesting that its land be specially appraised as open-space land. In com-
pleting the application, however, the taxpayer, a domestic entity, mistakenly
checked a box indicating the land was owned by a foreign entity. Land is
not eligible for open-space land designation if it is owned by a foreign en-
tity.' 82 Because of the foreign ownership designation, the appraisal district
denied the open-space application. The taxpayer asserted that it was entitled
to relief under Section 25.25(c)(1) because the error in completing the form
was a clerical error.' 83 The court disagreed, however, reasoning that Section
175. Nueces County, 853 S.W.2d at 218. In another important case addressing the Com-
merce Clause, the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Houston Court of
Appeals in Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Transamerica Container Leasing, Inc., 821
S.W.2d 637 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 113 S.
Ct. 1407 (U.S., Mar. 8, 1993)), that held that it was not constitutionally permissible for a
taxing unit to subject to property tax shipping containers that were frequently present in the
district but which were used exclusively in foreign commerce. The court remanded the case to
the Texas Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of the holding in Itel Containers.
See supra text accompanying notes 2-14. In Transamerica, the Houston Court of Appeals had
ruled that the property tax violated the Commerce Clause because there was no evidence that
the tax would not create an enhanced risk that the containers would be subjected to multiple
international taxation. It is not clear, however, that the court of appeals should reach a differ-
ent result in Transamerica than it did in its first opinion given that Texas' property tax does
not expressly allow for a credit of taxes imposed in foreign jurisdictions against the Texas
property tax.
176. 850 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
177. Id. at 599.
178. Id.
179. Id. The taxpayer argued unsuccessfully that the Uniform Commercial Code provides
strong proof that title to repossessed property passes directly from the debtor to the ultimate
purchaser in a foreclosure sale, and is not held by the secured party upon repossession. Id.
180. 855 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
181. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)(1) (Vernon 1992).
182. Id. § 23.56(3) (Vernon 1992).
183. Section 25.25(c)(1) provides that the appraisal roll may be changed only under certain
circumstances, including on the motion of the chief appraiser or of a property owner to correct
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25.25(c)(1) was intended to allow for the correction of clerical errors by the
appraisal district, not the property owner. 184
In Brooks County Central Appraisal District v. Tipperary Energy Corp. 185
however, the court interpreted procedural requirements somewhat loosely in
order to allow a taxpayer to receive a refund of taxes it was not required to
pay. In this case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the voluntary
payment rule and other procedural obstacles did not prevent the taxpayer
from being entitled to a tax refund in a circumstance in which another entity
had paid taxes for the same property for the same years.'8 6 The taxing au-
thorities asserted that the taxpayer was not entitled to a refund for the fol-
lowing reasons: (i) the application of the voluntary payment rule which
prevents taxpayers from refunds of taxes paid voluntarily; 87 (ii) by failing to
file a protest and a correction motion, which is filed to correct a clerical
error, 188 the taxpayer failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; (iii) the
authorization of refunds under Section 31.11 of the Tax Code,'189 which ad-
dresses refunds for erroneous payments, 190 are only allowed where the pay-
ment is in excess of the tax bill; and (iv) the taxpayer was barred from
receiving a refund because the taxpayer had rendered the property.
The court rejected each of these arguments. Specifically, the court rea-
soned that the taxpayer's payment was not voluntary because it was not
aware of all relevant facts before making the payment (i.e., that another tax-
payer had already paid such taxes). 191 With respect to the assertion that the
taxpayer did not exhaust it administrative remedies, the court concluded
that the filing of a protest is not necessary to correct an appraisal roll under
Section 25.25 of the Tax Code, 192 and that a correction motion was not nec-
essary in circumstances in which two tax statements had been generated for
the same property, as in the facts at hand. 19 3 In addressing Section 31.11,
the court ruled that the section should not be read to allow taxing units a
windfall merely because the taxes paid identically matched the tax bill, and
clerical errors that affect a property's liability for tax. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)(1)
(Vernon 1992).
184. Northeast Dallas Associates, 855 S.W.2d at 849.
185. 847 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 595.
188. Generally, in order to challenge a tax, taxpayers have the duty to exhaust administra-
tive remedies, including filing a protest and appearing at an Appraisal Review Board hearing.
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41, 42 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994). Under Section 25.25(c) of
the Tax Code, a taxpayer is required to submit a written order to correct a clerical error; such
written order is referred to as a "correction motion." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)
(Vernon 1992).
189. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.11 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994).
190. This section provides that if a taxpayer applies for a refund of an overpayment or a
erroneous payment of taxes which is determined by the auditor to be a valid claim, the tax
collector is required to refund the amount of such excessive or erroneous payments. If, how-
ever, the amount of the refund exceeds $500, the tax collector is prohibited from making the
refund unless the governing body of the taxing unit determines that the payment was errone-
ous or excessive and agrees to make the refund. Id. § 31.1 (a).
191. Tipperary Energy, 847 S.W.2d at 595.
192. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994).
193. Tipperary Energy, 847 S.W.2d at 596-98.
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that taxpayer's payment was "erroneous," given that it did not know taxes
had already been paid on the property. 194 Finally, the court reasoned that
Hunt County Tax Appraisal District v. Rubbermaid 195 made it clear that the
doctrine of estoppel by rendition no longer precludes a refund.' 96
The Texas Supreme Court in Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dis-
trict 197 held that heirs of an estate are not personally liable for property
taxes imposed on property owned by the estate during its pendency. 198 In
asserting that the heirs possessed personal liability for such taxes, the taxing
authority argued that (i) title to the property vests immediately in the heirs
upon the decedent's death, and (ii) Section 37 of the Probate Code 99 pro-
vides that heirs are liable to the payment of the debts of the intestate. The
court disagreed, concluding that for tax purposes heirs are not considered
owners of property in an estate still being administered. 200 Indeed, the court
used Section 37 of the Probate Code as support for its position, citing that
under Section 37, the administrator, as trustee of the estate property, is
vested with legal title to property held by the estate. 20 1 As holder of legal
title, the court reasoned that the trustee is the tax owner of the property. 2
0 2
C. LEGISLATION
In yet another attempt to meet the Texas Supreme Court mandate to
equalize public education funding, the Texas Legislature, after rancorous ne-
gotiations, enacted Senate Bill 7, that essentially establishes a new public
school finance system.20 3 A key component of this new system is that each
194. Id. at 598-99.
195. 719 S.W.2d 215, 220-21 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ refd n.r.e.).
196. Tipperary Energy, 847 S.W.2d at 599.
197. 862 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1993).
198. Id. at 584.
199. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
200. Bailey, 862 S.W.2d at 584.
201. Id. at 584-85.
202. Id. In Opinion No. DM-195 the Attorney General addressed an important proce-
dural tax issue. This ruling interpreted Section 34.04 of the Tax Code, which addresses a
taxpayer's ability to claim proceeds in excess of those necessary to pay a property tax liability
that are generated from a tax sale of the property. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.04 (Vernon
1992). The section requires a claimant to file a petition in the court that ordered the tax sale in
order to recover excess proceeds. Id. The Attorney General ruled that in order to claim
properly such excess proceeds, the former owner simply needs to file a petition in the foreclo-
sure action whereby the owner makes a claim for the excess proceeds, and is not required to
file a separate lawsuit. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-195 (1993).
203. Act of May 31, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 347, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1479. Senate Bill
7 was actually the Texas Legislature's second attempt in 1993 to create a new public school
finance system to equalize public education funding. On February 15, 1993, the Texas Legisla-
ture passed Senate Joint Resolution 7, which proposed to amend the constitution to authorize
the legislature to redistribute property tax revenues levied by one school district among other
school districts, and to exempt school districts in certain circumstances from complying with
certain unfunded state education mandates. See Sen. J. Res. 7, 73d Leg., R.S., 1993 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. vol. 1, A-2 (Vernon). On May 1, 1993, however, voters in a special election rejected
the proposed amendment, thereby requiring the Texas Legislature to devise a new school fi-
nancing scheme in order to meet the Texas Supreme Court's mandate in Edgewood III. See
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. School Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 826 S.W.2d
489 (Tex. 1992).
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school district which has a "wealth per student" (generally defined as the
taxable value of its property divided by its number of students) 2° 4 that is in
excess of the "equalized wealth level" (initially defined as $280,000, but that
is adjusted each year)20 5 is required to exercise one of five options in order to
reduce its "wealth per student" to the "equalized wealth level." '20 6
The five options a school district can employ to reduce its "wealth per
student" are: (i) consolidating with another district (i.e., a district with a
low wealth per student); 20 7 (ii) detaching territory in the school district and
having it annexed to another school district, thereby allowing the school
district to which the property is annexed to collect the ad valorem tax reve-
nues from such property;20 8 (iii) purchasing an average daily attendance
credit (i.e., paying funds to the Commissioner of Education in order to be
credited with additional students, thereby decreasing the district's "wealth
per student"); 20 9 (iv) contracting for the education of nonresident students,
thereby reducing a district's "wealth per student" by increasing its number
of students; 210 and (v) consolidating its tax base with another district. 21' In
order to employ options (iii), (iv) and (v) above, however, a school district
must obtain voter approval. 2 12
Senate Bill 7 also sets a $1.50 limit on the total tax rate a school district
may impose unless a higher rate has been approved by voters.21 3 (Irrespec-
tive of whether voter approval of a higher rate is obtained, however, the
maintenance and operations portion of the tax rate cannot exceed $1.50.)211
By setting these limits, school districts are limited in their ability to use Tier
3 as a funding source. Tier 3 is additional revenue from local property taxes
in excess of amounts necessary to provide the basic allotment and the guar-
anteed yield under Tiers 1 and 2.215
The new school finance legislation abolishes, effective September 1, 1993,
204. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 36.001(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
205. Id. § 36.002.
206. Id. § 36.003. In order to attempt to address possible constitutional challenges to Sen-
ate Bill 7, the Texas Legislature added a provision to the public school finance bill which
provides that if any of the five options of achieving an equalized wealth level are ultimately
held to be invalid by a court, a school district is entitled to exercise any one of the remaining
options. Id. § 36.009(a). In addition, the statute provides that if it is ultimately held that each
of the five options is invalid, the Commissioner of Education has the authority to adopt a plan
to equalize school funding that least disrupts effected school districts. Id. § 36.009(b). These
provisions may have been added to the statute to deter school districts from suing to challenge
the constitutionality of Senate Bill 7, given that other options might be perceived to be worse
than those provided in Senate Bill 7. To the extent these provisions were designed to deter
lawsuits challenging the legislation, however, they were unsuccessful. See supra notes 222-23
and accompanying text.
207. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 36.031-36.034 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
208. Id. §§ 36.061-36.065.
209. Id. §§ 36.091-36.096.
210. Id. §§ 36.121-36.123.
211. Id. §§ 36.151-36.160.
212. Id. §§ 36.096, 36.122 and 36.154.
213. Id. § 20.09(a).
214. Id. § 20.04(d).
215. See Edgewood I.S.D. v. Meno, No. 362,516 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.,
Dec. 9, 1993).
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county education districts, which were used unsuccessfully as a vehicle
under prior law to attempt to equalize school funding.2 16 The legislation
also appears to provide a deterrent to school districts' entering abatement
agreements. 21
7
Not surprisingly, the usual suspects (certain property-rich and property-
poor districts) quickly challenged Senate Bill 7 on a variety of constitutional
and other grounds. 218 In an elaborate opinion, the District Court of Travis
County upheld Senate Bill 7, calling the legislation "perhaps our last hope
for establishing the system of public education our forbearers believed essen-
tial to the preservation of our liberties and rights. ' 21 9 There is, of course,
little doubt that the Texas Supreme Court will ultimately address the valid-
ity of Senate Bill 7.
There were a number of other important procedural and substantive prop-
erty tax provisions enacted during 1993. For example, the Texas legislature
created new exemptions and modified certain existing exemptions. New Sec-
tion 11.181 of the Tax Code 220 exempts real property owned by certain char-
itable organizations for the purpose of building or repairing housing on
property primarily with volunteer labor to sell without profit to a low-in-
come individual or family.22 1 The definition of a "residence homestead,"
which is entitled to a partial property tax exemption, 222 was expanded to
include residential property owned by one or more individuals through a
beneficial interest in a qualifying trust if the beneficiary uses the property as
his principal residence. 223 Texas voters approved in November, 1993, a con-
216. Act of May 31, 1993, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1481 (Vernon).
217. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 36.008 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
218. Edgewood I.S.D. v. Meno, No. 362,516 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 9,
1993).
219. Id.
220. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.181 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
221. Id. Section 11.181, however, provides that the exemption expires after the third anni-
versary of the date the exempt organization acquires the relevant property. Id. § 11. 18 1(b).
222. Id. § 11.13.
223. Id. The requirements of a "qualifying trust" are quite lengthy, and will certainly be
subject to litigation. A "qualifying trust" generally means a trust which provides the trustor
the right to use and occupy as his or her principal residence property rent free and without
charge (except for taxes and certain other costs) for life, or for the lesser of life or a term of
years, or until the date the trust is revoked or terminated. Id. § 11.13(j)(3). In addition, the
property is not acquired pursuant to a "qualifying trust" unless the trust acquires the relevant
property pursuant to an instrument which (i) describes the property with reasonable certainty;
(ii) is recorded in the real property records in the county in which the property is located; and
(iii) is executed by the trustor or its representative. Id. § 11.13(j)(3)(B).
Prior to this case, it was unclear whether property owned by a trust but that was used as the
primary residence of the trustor was entitled to the residence homestead exemption. Given
that Section 11. 13 of the Tax Code (prior to amendment in 1993) expressly required that the
property be owned by an individual in order qualify for the exemption, taxpayers may have
had a difficult time establishing a residence homestead exemption for property legally owned
by a trust. However, City of Mesquite v. Malouf, 553 S.W.2d, 639 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1977, writ. refd n.r.e.), could be used as support for the argument that the exemption should
apply even under prior law. In this case, the court addressed whether beneficiaries or the
trustee were the owners of property for purposes of determining whether the property qualified
for the benefit of agricultural appraisal. The court stated that when a valid trust is created, the
beneficiaries become the owners of the equitable or beneficial title to the trust property, and are
considered real owners. Id. at 644. Therefore, this case could be used for support that the
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stitutional amendment allowing the Texas legislature to exempt from ad
valorem tax real and personal property that is used, constructed, acquired or
installed wholly or partly for certain pollution control purposes. 2 2 4
Section 11.251(k) of the Tax Code, 225 addressing the freeport exemption,
was amended to state explicitly that property otherwise meeting the freeport
exemption is exempt irrespective of whether the person who owns the prop-
erty on January 1 is the same person who transports it outside Texas. 226
Pursuant to amended Section 11.18 of the Tax Code,227 nonprofit hospitals
must meed stricter requirements in order to qualify for tax-exempt status.228
In addition to amending and creating exemptions, the legislature made
other important changes to substantive property tax law provisions. New
Section 23.175 of the Tax Code2 2 9 requires that if a real property interest in
oil or gas in place is valued for property tax purposes by a method that takes
into account expected future income from the sale of oil or gas to be pro-
duced from the property, the method must base its values on the average
price of the oil or gas from the interest during the preceding year. 230 The
Texas legislature repealed the tax on the intangible value of the transporta-
tion operation of the following businesses: railroads, toll roads, toll bridges,
ferries, oil pipelines and common carrier pipelines engaged in the transporta-
tion of oil.23 1 New Sections 23.12A and 23.12B of the Tax Code 232 require
motor vehicle dealers to pay property taxes on inventory based on the aver-
age inventory over the prior twelve month period,233 and to make monthly
deposits based on vehicles sold during the months. 234
Many important procedural changes were made to the Tax Code. New
subsections 26.15(g) and 31.11(b) of the Tax Code235 allow taxing units to
offset property tax refunds against delinquent tax liabilities of the person
entitled to the refund. 2 36 Pursuant to amended Section 32.01 of the Tax
Code, tax liens on inventory, furniture, equipment and other personal prop-
erty attach to after-acquired personal property. 237
residence homestead applies under prior law in circumstances in which the property was
owned by a trust.
224. House J. Res. 86, 1993 Tex. Sess Law. Serv. vol. 3, A-1 (Vernon). See TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 11.31 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (implementing the legislation). One of the issues
almost certain to arise in connection with the new exemption for pollution control property is
the extent to which particular devices are used to control pollution.
225. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251(k) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
226. Id.
227. Id. § 11.18.
228. Id.
229. Id. § 23.175.
230. Id.
231. Act of June 9, 1993, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1859 (Vernon).
232. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 23.12A and 23.12B (Vernon Supp. 1994).
233. Id. § 23.12A(c).
234. Id. § 23.12B. This provision essentially allows motor vehicle dealers to prepay taxes
as vehicles are sold, and may enable dealers to facilitate passing along to buyers the cost of
such taxes.
235. Id. §§ 26.15(g), 31.11(b).
236. Id.
237. Id. § 32.01(b). In addition, new Section 32.01(c) provides that tax liens are perfected
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Section 11.433 of the Tax Code,238 addressing late applications for the
property tax exemption for religious organizations, was amended to provide
that the application may be filed as late as December 31 of the 12th year
after the year in which the taxes for which the exemption is claimed were
imposed, assuming the application is filed before January 1, 1995.239 Section
42.43(b) 240 was amended to change the interest rate on property tax refunds
from 10% per year to an annual rate based on three-month Treasury bills,
generally not to exceed 8%.241 The due date for rendition statements for
income-producing personal property was changed to April 15 from April
1.242
Section 34.21 of the Tax Code243 was amended to change the former two-
year redemption period for recovering real property sold at a tax sale to a
six-month redemption period, although the two-year redemption period still
applies to residential homesteads and agricultural land. 244 This amendment
implements a constitutional amendment that was ratified by voters in No-
vember, 1993.245
IV. OTHER NEW DEVELOPMENTS: OTHER LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES, PERSONAL LIABILITY, AND NEW
COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS
Legislative changes authorized the comptroller to require a power of at-
torney, 246 modified statute of limitation provisions with respect to claims for
refund 247 by providing that the statute of limitations does not apply if the
tax due, after "correction of [an] error" exceeds the amount of tax reported
by at least twenty-five percent, 248 and made other changes to the statutes of
on attachment and, subject to an exception for manufactured homes purchased by certain bona
fide purchasers, perfection requires no further action by the taxing unit imposing the tax.
238. Id. § 11.433.
239. Id.; Nueces County Appraisal Dist. v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc.,
860 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ pending) held, however, that Section
11.433 is unconstitutional. If this holding stands, the amendment to Section 11.433 would be
meaningless.
240. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.43(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 22.23(a). In addition, the chief appraiser may extend the deadline to April 30 if
the taxpayer demonstrates good cause in writing. Id. § 22.23(b).
243. Id. § 34.21.
244. Id.
245. Sen. J. Res. 19, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. vol. 4 (Vernon).
246. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.023 (Vernon Supp. 1994). According to comptroller
representatives, this section was necessary to avoid situations in which unauthorized taxpayer
representatives filed claims for refund on behalf of taxpayers who may not have wanted such
refund claims filed (e.g., because the filing of such claims may permit the comptroller to assess
tax, notwithstanding the statute of limitations). See id., § 111.2051 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
Nonetheless, some taxpayer representatives contend that the change was intended to discour-
age taxpayer representatives from aggressively pursuing claims for refund.
247. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.2051, which replaces former TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 111.205.
248. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § i11.205(a)(3) (Vernon 1992) provided, prior to the 1993
legislation, that the TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.201 statute of limitation did not apply if
information contained in a tax report "contains a gross error and the amount of tax due and
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limitations for refunds.249 The 73d Legislature also enacted several proce-
dural and administrative provisions.250 In addition, the legislature short-
ened, from ninety days to forty-five days, the time period following a notice
from the state after which a corporation's privileges may be forfeited for
failure to pay franchise tax.251
A handful of court cases highlight some of the procedural and substantive
issues raised by taxpayers.
In First State Bank of Dumas v. Sharp2 5 2 the Court held, not surprisingly,
that Section 112.108253 prohibiting declaratory judgments with respect to
invalid taxing statutes also prohibits declaratory judgment challenges to reg-
ulations.25 4 As evidenced by court cases in which the government has
brought claims against individuals for the debts of the corporation, the state
continues to take action aggressively against individuals, although not al-
ways successfully. 255
Attorney fees are also at issue in several pending Texas cases. Section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code 256 allows a party to recover attor-
neys' fees from the government when the government has, under color of
state law, violated the party's constitutional rights. 257 After a 1991 United
States Supreme Court decision 258 permitted recovery under Section 1983,
both taxpayers and states began focusing more carefully on Section 1983
payable after correction of the error is 25% or more greater than the amount originally re-
ported." As revised, the statute defines "gross error" as one that meets the 25% test.
249. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.201 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (concerning statutes of limita-
tions). See also United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Texas, 843 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Austin
1992, writ denied) that held, in a motor-fuel bond case, that statutes of limitation for assess-
ment and collection of delinquent taxes apply to a taxpayer's surety, and that taxpayer's bank-
ruptcy did not toll the statute of limitations against the surety. See also TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 111.201.
250. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.060 (stating that interest rate on delinquent
taxes is now 12% simple interest rather than 12% compounded monthly); § 111.1042 (explic-
itly permitting informal review of refund claim prior to hearing); § 111.021 (allowing comp-
troller additional rights to seize and levy bank accounts of delinquent taxpayers).
251. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.251 and 171.256 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
252. 863 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, n.w.h.).
253. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.108.
254. The taxpayers challenged 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.411(d) (West 1987) concerning
the classification for franchise tax purposes of a bank's receipts from dividend and interest,
including interest paid by the federal government. 863 S.W.2d at 82. Jackson v. Sharp, 846
S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, n.w.h.) also focused on procedural issues, holding that a
taxpayer contesting tax imposed under Controlled Substance Tax Act must comply with TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 112.108 requirements to contest. See also R Communications v. Sharp,
839 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ granted) (holding valid Tax Code Section
112.051 requirement that taxpayer pay deficiency; taxpayer argued unsuccessfully that Texas
Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (TEX. REV. CIV, STAT. ANN. 7252-13a,
§ 19 (Pamph. 1992) provided jurisdiction without requiring payment, and that TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 112.051 is unconstitutional.
255. See, e.g., Davis v. Texas, 846 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, n.w.h.) holding,
contrary to earlier decisions, that an individual defendant could be held personally liable for a
corporation's unpaid franchise taxes only if they became due and payable after the corporate
privileges were forfeited.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
257. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1988).
258. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991).
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claims. In several Texas cases, the attorney general has filed motions to dis-
miss Section 1983 claims, on the ground that the relief provided by the
Texas Tax Code is exclusive. Other states have taken similar positions, and
there is not yet a definitive court ruling on the issue in Texas. 259
The comptroller focused on several programs during the survey period,
including the Renaissance Project, 260 the new Dispute Resolution pro-
gram 26' and the Revenue Opportunity Program. 262 The changes that these
programs will bring and the continuing controversy that courts will face en-
sure that state taxes will continue to be a rapidly-evolving area of the law.
259. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in two recent cases ensures that the issue will
continue to arise. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 500 N.W.2d 196 (N.D. 1993), cert. denied,
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 114 S. Ct. 173 (1993), addressed Quill's claim that it was entitled
to prevail on its § 1983 counterclaim and that, as such, it was entitled to attorneys' fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court denied Quill's petition,
holding that "a § 1983 action seeking to enjoin the collection of state taxes is not cognizable in
state court, and accordingly Quill is not entitled to recover its attorney's fees under § 1988."
500 N.W.2d at 202. This is a subsequent proceeding to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S.
Ct. 1904 (1992), discussed at Ohlenforst & Dorrill, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46
SMU L. REV. 1803 (1993). See also Bloomingdale's by Mail Ltd. v. Huddleston, 848 S.W.2d
52 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, Huddleston v. Bloomingdale's by Mail, 113 S. Ct. 3002 (1993).
This case, which allowed award of fees, is particularly interesting because the taxpayer had not
originally pleaded for relief under Section 1983.
260. This project is intended to focus on ways to improve various aspects of the comptrol-
ler's office, including the administrative hearings process.
261. A Dispute Resolution Officer's task is roughly analogous to an Internal Revenue Ser-
vice appeals officer's task.
262. This aptly-named program is designed to find areas or industries with respect to which
the comptroller may be able to increase tax collections and/or compliance.
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